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  Abstract
Under the joint responsibility of the Member States to imple-
ment EU law, administrative law systems of the EU are converging and a 
common body of EU administrative law is emerging. Most debates on this process 
of EU administrative law integration have focused on differences and divergences 
between national systems vis-à-vis the EU system. The concept of administra-
tion at the level of the EU, however, is difficult to compare to that in use in most 
domestic systems in continental Europe. In this contribution, we bring the lens of 
the United States (U.S.) approach to the debate. The problems and challenges the 
EU administration faces do resemble those which confronted the federal admin-
istration in the U.S. more than 50 years ago. The article discusses some of the 
parallels between the U.S. and EU system and zooms in on the EU’s ‘problem 
zones’: preparation of regulation – in particular the role of participation and the 
use of evidence therein – and the position of agencies. On the basis of experiences 
with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in controlling the U.S. administra-
tion and the federal agencies, the contribution then reflects on the desirability of a 
general EU Administrative Law Act, especially in view of the upcoming extension 
of judicial review of general rules the Lisbon Treaty will most likely bring. The 
conclusion is in short that the American APA offers food for European thought 
and that a lot could be gained with a European styled APA ‘light version’.
 1  Introduction: Towards ‘New Administrative Law’ 
in Europe?
The variety in systems of legal protection against adminis-
trative action in the European Union (EU) is immense. Even though admin-
istrative law and the accompanying systems of legal protection in a lot of EU 
Member States stem from common roots, differences in historical develop-
ments, culture, political systems, organization of the judiciary and organiza-
tion of the administration have resulted in wide-ranging and state-specific 
structures. For example, it varies from one country to another in what way 
  Hofmann & Türk 2009.
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the dividing line between public and private law is drawn, whether or not 
rules with a general application can be challenged, or how appeals can be 
lodged. 
The discussion on the development of some form of integrated EU 
administrative law system has, hitherto, mainly focused on a debate over the 
‘European’ differences or – as the case might be – similarities of systems of 
administrative law and legal protection against administrative action.2 In 
this paper we aim to show that the debate on European administrative law 
can be usefully enriched by including the United States (U.S.) approach as 
well. We do so mindful of some important caveats. Evidently at the EU level 
the classical continental concept of administration is not readily applicable 
and we acknowledge that the EU itself is not a fully fledged parliamentary 
system, and that – as a consequence – the control over the administration is 
set up differently than in conventional parliamentary systems. Moreover, in 
the EU the administration is not a mere executive but an important regula-
tor as well. This does however prompt discussion similar to the ones we 
find in the U.S. context. The discretionary powers of the administration, its 
regulatory politics and the limited control of parliament ask for an approach 
of administrative law that differs from national concepts in the Member 
States. Or, in Shapiro’s words, ‘[a]s in the US, the new administrative law for 
the European Union is very much about the location and intensity of regula-
tory authority.’
We are certainly not the first to compare and contrast the U.S. system 
of administrative law system – especially that of administrative procedure 
– to Europe’s evolving administrative law system. The overall conclusion of 
various comparisons by others was that American procedural administra-
tive law can be an important source of inspiration for EU administrative 
law but that the U.S. and EU system are too different, not only in architec-
ture but also in context, to go further than that. At this particular moment 
in time, however, there are reasons to review this assessment. Important 
developments do occur in European horizontal regulatory policy (usually 
labelled ‘Better Regulation’, but also encompassing wider shifts in modes of 
regulatory governance), as well as small but significant changes in the EU’s 
constitutional design. The Treaty of Lisbon introduces a new paragraph four 
to Article 20 of the EC Treaty (‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union’, now the Lisbon Treaty is ratified) which makes it possible to appeal 
2  Seerden & Stroink 2002.
  The EU system of separation of powers is that of ‘institutional balance’, and this, according 
to Yatanagas, connotes the difficulty of describing in familiar public law terms a necessarily 
unprecedented system (that of the EU), Yatanagas 200, p. . 
  Shapiro 99a, p. 2.
  See e.g. Harlow 999; Shapiro 200.
  Article 2 in the consolidated version to be exact.
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a ‘regulatory act’, without being ‘individually’ affected. Although the jury 
is not out yet on what exactly constitutes a regulatory act, it is clear that 
delegated regulations, delegated directives and implementing acts (hereafter 
‘executive regulations’) will fall under the scope of the new provision. In 
effect this will give any natural or legal person the right to obtain judicial 
review of EU executive regulations. The possibility of appeal against execu-
tive regulations has proven central to the U.S. system of administrative legal 
protection. Whereas the adoption of an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
was instrumental to the development of administrative law, it was the combi-
nation with judicial review that produced such a coherent system. Without 
shunning some negative side effects of the way in which judges at times 
have exercised judicial review, such as a culture of legal adversialism, ossifi-
cation of the rulemaking procedure, we revisit the American mechanisms as 
solutions for European problems in this article.
The structure is as follows: First we draw out some historic parallels 
between the two systems (section 2). Next, we zoom in on the EU’s ‘problem 
zones’: the preparation of regulation, and in particular public participation 
and the use of evidence (section ) and the position of agencies (section ). 
We describe the legitimacy problems in those areas but we also analyse 
shifts that have taken place in the last decade or so. Then we turn to the 
concrete experiences of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in control-
ling the U.S. administration and the federal agencies (section ). In the 
conclusion we reflect – in the light of the respective problem zones described 
– on the desirability of an EU Administrative Law Act, possibly inspired by 
the Administrative Procedure Act of the U.S. 
 2  Comparing Two Traditions in Legal Protection 
Against Administrative and Regulatory Action
 2. Administration, Regulation and Governance
Discussing the relevance of an instrument like the Ameri-
can APA for the European Union might look like a futile exercise in the 
traditional scholarly view since the concepts and context of administration 
and administrative law on both sides of the Atlantic differ substantially. The 
U.S. concept of administration is distinctive from the European one because 
  The term ‘regulatory act’ does not tie in well to the distinction the Articles 29a and 29b 
of the Lisbon Treaty (Articles 290 and 29 in the consolidated version of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU) make between legislative acts and non-legislative acts. Several 
authors have already noticed that it is unclear what is exactly meant by ‘regulatory’ act here. 
See e.g. Barents 200, p. 0 and Koch 200, p.  and 20-2.
  Shapiro 200.
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it is an emanation of the system of separation of powers under the U.S. Con-
stitution, the presidential system of government and the system of control 
primarily via judicial. The courts operate in a long tradition of constitutional 
review and its ability to strike down rules form a cornerstone of American 
administrative law. Thus, in the American context administrative legal 
protection lies at the intersection of regulation and constitutional law, as a 
consequence of the presidential system with a semi-independent administra-
tion in charge of regulatory governance.
Speaking of ‘administration’ has often been discarded as ‘old-fashioned’ 
in the European Union and it has therefore been substituted by terms such 
as ‘governance’.9 By contrast, the ‘Global Administrative Law’ movement 
claims that revisiting administrative law concepts actually helps us under-
stand processes of ‘global governance’.0 It also observes that even trans-
national and supranational instances of public-decision-making over time 
gravitate towards administrative law constructions originally exclusively 
found in the context of the nation state. This could be evidence of a transsys-
temic conception of what counts as the best way to protect citizens against 
government, sometimes coupled with the notion of ‘regulatory capitalism’. 
There is a normative element to this approach, namely that the return to 
classical administrative law arrangements is to be applauded. Translated 
to the EU context, this means thinking in terms of an ‘administrative ius 
commune’.2 Analyses of the similarities between the European administra-
tive process and the processes of the Member States, point to convergence 
in some areas as well as divergence in others, instead of to one ‘European 
administrative space’. A second approach, which can be normative or 
merely descriptive, focuses on legal borrowing by one system from another. 
In the EU context this ties in with reports of perceptions within Commis-
sion services that the EU is converging towards the American approach 
through a juridification of Europe’s regulatory policies, as Majone has long 
predicted.
In any case it is important not to overlook that Europe’s concept of 
administration is – by and large – determined by another system of govern-
ment, parliamentary democracy, in which administrations are – for the 
most part – controlled and overseen by political bodies. The functions and 
tasks of the administration differ widely in the U.S. and the EU, as does the 
9  Joerges & Dehousse 2002; Harlow 200; Hofmann & Türk 200.
0  Kingsbury e.a. 200.
  Levi-Faur 200. See also Braithwaite 200.
2  Verhey e.a. 2002; Hofmann 2009.
  Siedentopf & Speer 200.
  Wiener 200.
  Kwast & Simon 200.
  Majone 99.
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law permitting and harnessing administrative action. In Europe debates 
on regulation, the regulatory state, oversight mechanisms and even public 
participation tend to be conducted in separate forums. However, the EU’s 
development as a super-regulator has changed that. Fuelled by the limited 
possibilities for steering through spending and built on the principle of 
conferred powers and defined regulatory mandates in the EC Treaty, the 
Institutions have developed their regulatory capacity. The introduction of 
a comprehensive horizontal policy for lawmaking, entitled ‘Better Regula-
tion’ in 2002 (see next section) can be seen as a confirmation of this broader 
development.
 2.2 Legitimizing Administrations
Any excessive focus on the differences between the two 
systems risks turning a blind eye to converging developments. The develop-
ments of administrative law in the U.S. and in the EU share an important 
feature. In both regimes the need for economic regulation and the creation 
of administrative law have gone hand in hand. Starting out with the U.S., 
agencies like the ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission) and the FTC (Fed-
eral Trade Commission), said to be one of the first agencies created in the 
U.S., were established near the turn of the century to control the anticom-
petitive behaviour of powerful corporations, such as the railroad companies. 
A wave of new agencies could be observed during the New Deal. After the 
Great Depression in the 90s President Roosevelt established agencies to 
stabilize the economy, regulate the free market and provide financial secu-
rity for individuals. 
The New Deal agencies were confronted with problems of a totally new 
dimension. They were involved in the regulation of private markets under 
increasingly indefinite and vague mandates that offered them significantly 
more discretion than the older ones.9 Defenders of the New Deal highly 
valued the expert knowledge of the new independent regulatory agencies 
and their discretionary powers to combat effectively the excesses of the free 
market. Courts and lawyers on the other hand were sceptical and feared 
the lawless exercise of discretion. The ABA (American Bar Association) 
advocated imposing detailed procedural checks and strict judicial review on 
  Wade, Ragnemalm and Strauss 99, p. 9.
  ‘Understandably, administrative law could grow no faster than the subject to which it 
attached: government regulation of the economy. But administrative procedure was, ironi-
cally, both an adjunct to and a reaction against economic regulation. It developed as much 
from deeply felt objections to government interference with the marketplace as from the 
necessity to make that interference coherent and credible’, Verkuil 9, p. 2.
9  Pierce, Shapiro & Verkuil 200, p. .
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agency action.20 A debate began between progressives, favouring agency flex-
ibility in organization and decision-making, and traditionalists, seeing the 
adversarial system as the only legitimate way for decision-making.2 
Criticism on the legitimacy of administrative actions also grew because 
the blended powers of the administration (both rulemaking and adjudi-
cation) did not fit with the doctrine of the separation of powers to which 
Americans traditionally pay reverence.22 The broad delegation of legislative 
power made ‘agencies, rather than Congress, the arena for debate and deci-
sion on complex policy questions of fundamental importance to our democ-
racy’.2 In contrast with Congress the constitutional and political legitimacy 
of agencies rulemaking is rather weak. Agencies are not directly accountable 
to the electorate and delegation of legislative powers to them is controversial. 
As all legislative powers are vested in Congress and cannot be delegated, the 
question arose whether broad delegation of regulatory powers was uncon-
stitutional. The vague mandates and far reaching regulatory powers of the 
New Deal agencies put this ‘nondelegation doctrine’ to the test. In 9 in 
several cases, the Supreme Court did find the delegation unconstitutional.2 
The degree of specificity of the mandate, the scope of power and the level 
of procedural protection offered to affected persons, defined whether the 
delegation stood up to the test. Although the Supreme Court has rejected 
nondelegation challenges concerning vague statutory language and no 
legislation has been struck down after the New Deal era, the non-delega-
tion doctrine has never been overturned expressly. It is widespread and 
still debated, especially whether it should and even could be reinvigorated. 
The determining factors of the doctrine have played a role in later case 
law (besides means of statutory interpretation to avoid constitutional ques-
tions). At least one of the arguments to strike down legislation with a broad 
mandate has changed significantly over time: the procedural safeguards 
available to interested persons have increased considerably.
Eventually, when the power of the administration had increased signifi-
cantly and the enthusiasm over the New Deal had faded, many felt the need 
for some form of legislation to limit the agency’s discretion. Judicial review 
alone, which had been available from the beginning of the administrative 
state, could not provide enough safeguards. After a turbulent period in the 
New Deal era, academic and legislative debate between progressives and 
traditionalists, the Administrative Procedure Act was introduced.2
20  Breyer a.o. 200, p. 9.
2  Shapiro 99b, p. 9-9; Verkuil 9, 2-29.
22  Breyer a.o. 200, p. ; Freedman 9.
2  Freedman 9, p. 0.
2  Breyer a.o. 200, p. -; Majone 200, p. ; Pierce, Shapiro & Verkuil 200, p. 9-.
2   U.S.C. §§-9.
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Currently the European administrative process finds itself in equally 
turbulent waters. Euro-scepticism flourished fervently the last two decades, 
criticizing the rule of bureaucrats in far away Brussels and the lack of trans-
parency. Academic evaluations of the legitimacy of EU administration vary: 
the assessments range from ‘secretive and unaccountable’ to ‘healthy and 
efficient’.2 But most agree that the EU system for public decision-making 
is one of a kind and consists of a patchwork of borrowed arrangements, 
compromises and constitutional oddities. The proper role and function of 
the European Commission as the EU’s administration is hard to define 
because it is permanently torn between a political one (a type of ‘govern-
ment’ at the heart of European politics) and an objective one (a type of 
‘agency’ executing the will of the Member States through the mandates of 
the Treaty).
Many of the recent policies to improve the accountability of the EU Insti-
tutions – not only Better Regulation, but the White Paper on Governance 
more broadly, as well as comitology reform – can be interpreted as looking 
for legitimacy outside the paradigm of parliamentary democracy, or at least 
a narrow version of it. This is where the U.S. experience can be of great 
use: its constitutional system is built around independent pillars of public 
powers, each deriving their legitimacy from a different source. The rulemak-
ing power of the administration over time has come to be embedded in a 
fine net of presidential and judicial checks. Within this system of checks 
and balances enhancing citizen access to public decision-making has been a 
crucial building block for achieving the accountability of government. Even 
if one does not want to go as far as to state that the structure of government 
in the EU bears a certain resemblance to the U.S. Constitution,2 it is likely 
that the EU can learn from the U.S. when it comes to solving the problems 
that come with a ‘regulation-centred’ system. Bignami identifies these 
problems as ‘how to hold the bureaucracy accountable in a system of divided 
lawmaking’ and ‘how to guarantee stakeholder participation’.2 In the next 
sections we zoom in on three examples of these Bignami ‘problem zones’ 
and highlight shifts of policy in these areas in reaction to these problems 
and the underlying legitimacy issues. 
2  For an overview, see Bignami 200, p. 2.
2  Bignami 999.
2  Ibid., p. .
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 3  Problem zone 1: ‘Notice and Comment’ and 
Information-Base in EU Regulatory Procedures
 . ‘Regulating Regulation’ through Better Regulation?
As a ‘regulatory power house’ the Commission has tradition-
ally favoured legislation to other policy instruments.29 From 2002 onwards, 
an enthusiasm for what was long considered an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ approach 
to lawmaking has swept the EU. After some doomed attempts to reform 
the regulatory environment step-by-step in the 990s, the European Com-
mission announced a more structural and non-sector specific approach to 
regulatory reform under the label ‘Better Regulation’. A comprehensive and 
integrated impact assessment (IA) system, 0 a continuous simplification 
programme, and in 200 a dedicated programme to reduce administrative 
burdens triggered by EU policies by 2% by 202, among other measures. 
In parallel to the Better Regulation initiative, the Commission also 
stepped up its commitment to public consultation in the lawmaking process. 
The commitment to systematically carry out, in an early stage of the policy 
cycle, assessments of the potential economic, social and environmental 
effects of all policy initiatives (IA) and to listen to all stakeholders in the 
course of the process (consultation) has required an overhaul of the tradi-
tional way of law preparation in the European Commission. These measures 
are intended to contribute to the solution for what have been identified 
above as the two main problems facing a constitutional system built around 
checks and balances between independent branches: accountability of the 
bureaucratic part of the lawmaker and public participation. The main source 
of the potential transformative power of EU IA stems from the developing 
regulatory oversight mechanisms. A secondary line of change consists of the 
capacities of EU IA to serve as a multi-level tool, facilitating the involvement 
of public and private actors from various levels. To illustrate the change in 
EU regulatory procedures the link between IA and public participation (or 
‘consultation’ in EU jargon) is crucial.
Arguably, the one defining feature of EU IA and one in which it differs 
from its American counterpart is that there is no fixed decision criterion. 
The IA Guidelines by the European Commission recommend applying cost-
benefit analysis where possible and without any obligation to choose the least 
29  Meuwese & Senden 2009.
0  Not to be confused with the Community law obligation for Member States to carry out ‘envi-
ronmental impact assessments’ on projects or plans. See Council Directive 9/ amending 
Directive / on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on 
the environment, and Directive 200/2 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Plans and Programmes on the Environment.
  Meuwese 200.
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costly policy option. Because IA is used in the first instance as an internal 
tool by non-democratically elected officials who are only mandated to prepare 
proposals and not decide on them, care is being taken to leave the final deci-
sion on what the content of a proposal should be to the College of Commis-
sioners. But even the College does not have a ‘blank mandate’ to propose just 
anything. As mentioned above, the Commission’s lawmaking powers are 
heavily restricted by the Treaty, which for many policy areas specifies certain 
policy goals to be pursued or certain considerations to be taken into account. 
A new framework for policy-making such as EU IA, which has not been 
put in place by a Treaty revision, but by ‘soft law’ and by changes in internal 
procedures only, cannot superimpose any decision criterion. Instead, the 
European Commission opted for a ‘warm’, procedural type of IA, where 
the main goal is to make lawmakers aware of the costs and benefits – or 
‘impacts’ in the terminology preferred by the European Commission – asso-
ciated with the legislation they plan to adopt. The primary strength of IA as 
a tool of Better Regulation is that it is supposed to make legislative actors 
more intelligent and more accountable.2 But IA is not only meant to simply 
inform those involved in the formation of law and policy at the EU level. By 
structuring the deliberation process and by highlighting the trade-offs that 
the political decision-makers face, IA is envisaged to make more transparent 
the way in which various actors – including private stakeholders – exercise 
their powers. 
Here we get to the bottom of the nature of European IA. Instead of 
replacing political decision-making, it accommodates other mechanisms 
that support the political process, such as pressure from interest groups, 
political discussion in the cabinet, white papers and evidence produced by 
expert committees. Stakeholder consultation and collection of expertise are 
integrated in the IA process and inform the wider assessment process. At 
the end of this internal assessment process, the Commission publishes an 
IA report summarizing the results and ideally highlighting the trade-offs 
between the impacts associated with various options. The IA tool is mainly 
intended to be used in decision-making regarding ‘secondary legislation’ 
(directives and regulation). In the early days of the new regime, IA was not 
applied to comitology decisions (see next section) at all, but recently ‘volun-
tary’ IAs have appeared in this decision-making procedure too.
For the position of private stakeholders in regulatory procedures we 
should go back to the White Paper on Governance from 200 and the policy 
documents that the European Commission published subsequently, such as 
the report on Improving and Simplifying the Regulatory Environment and 
2  Radaelli and Meuwese 2009.
  Often simply referred to as the ‘impact assessment’ even if in fact the term ‘impact assess-
ment’ covers the whole process and not just the report. All impact assessment reports can 
be downloaded from http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/practice_en.htm. 
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the Communication on Better Lawmaking from 2002. In this latter commu-
nication, the promotion of a culture of dialogue and participation, through 
the establishment of minimum standards for external consultations, was 
emphasised. Concretely, the Commission adopted, on  December 2002, 
a communication ‘General principles and minimum standards for consul-
tation of interested parties by the Commission’, the provisions of which 
entered into effect on  January 200. The general principles articulated 
are participation, openness and accountability, effectiveness, coherence. 
The crucial question is what happens when the Commission violates its 
own minimum standards on consultation? There is some degree of enforce-
ment of the requirement to consult by the Commission’s new internal IA 
quality control body. The Impact Assessment Board (IAB) is a hybrid body 
which is part of a subtle system of checks and balances with carefully 
formulated competences: it has no veto power but it is entitled to ask for 
resubmission of draft IAs, with the Secretariat General, represented on the 
Board in the person of the Deputy Secretary General, expected to guard the 
line between quality control and control over substance will become blurred. 
Although it does not possess the clear regulatory overview task that the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the United States 
Office of Management and Budget has, the IAB has considerable leverage, 
especially because it raises the profile of IA among the higher ranks of the 
Commission administration. For instance, it will tell services to incorporate 
the views of consultees more clearly or to justify better why consultation has 
been undertaken in a more limited way than usual.
All IAB opinions are published online but only once the proposal and 
the IA themselves have been published. This is in order to avoid the IAB 
opinions being regarded as ‘previews’ of the real IAs by stakeholders. Prob-
  COM (2002)0.
  The main provisions that operationalise these principles are the following: 
‘All communications relating to consultation should be clear and concise, and should 
include all necessary information to facilitate responses.’ 
‘When defining the target group(s) in a consultation process, the Commission should 
ensure that relevant parties have an opportunity to express their opinions.’ 
‘The Commission should ensure adequate awareness-raising publicity and adapt its 
communication channels to meet the needs of all target audiences. Without excluding other 
communication tools, open public consultations should be published on the Internet and 
announced at the ‘single access point’.’ 
‘The Commission should provide sufficient time for planning and responses to invita-
tions and written contributions. The Commission should strive to allow at least  weeks 
for reception of responses to written public consultations and 20 working days notice for 
meetings.’ 
‘Receipt of contributions should be acknowledged. Results of open public consultation 
should be displayed on websites linked to the single access point on the Internet.’
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ably for that very reason, stakeholders would have liked to see the opinions 
be made public earlier, but the Commission holds on to the position that 
this would undermine the necessary and constitutional space in which it 
can exercise discretion. The same reasoning applies to the publications of 
the impact assessment reports themselves. However, the information that is 
available in the usual phase in which consultation takes place – early on in 
the process is often so minimal that it is difficult for stakeholders to focus 
on their comments. This does however somewhat undermine the gist of 
the general principles and minimum standards. As Craig has pointed out, 
in the U.S., participation rights have been given teeth by a requirement in 
the case law to provide for a sufficient information base. The mechanism 
works both ways: if more information is available courts are more likely to 
review it, or to use it when reviewing regulation. And, if participation rights 
are valued, it makes more sense to require a sound information basis for 
stakeholders to base their input on and for courts to evaluate the soundness 
of the decision-making process. 
 .2 New Directions in Case Law
To the amazement of many American observers, many of 
whom would name this as the first requirement for ‘good regulation’, EU 
citizens do not have standing in the European court to apply for review 
of EU directives and regulations. As mentioned in the introduction, this 
may change with the scrapping of the ‘individuality requirement’ in the 
Lisbon Treaty, although it is by no mean certain and according to many even 
unlikely that the term ‘regulatory acts’ will be interpreted to encompass 
directives and regulations (‘secondary legislation’) as well. But even apart 
from this change, it should be noted that the European Court of Justice has 
paved the way – through its famous Francovich case law – for individuals 
and stakeholders to resort to their national courts for enforcement of EU law 
against their national governments. Yet, this case law also has its limita-
tions and in the current state of affairs lawyers still find it hard to imagine 
a kind of ‘right to require effective regulation’ in the EU – whether it is at 
the domestic or the supranational level. Instead, most significant case law 
developments have taken place in the realm of procedural review. The Court 
of Justice, as final arbiter on the validity of EU law, has shown some signs of 
an ambition to play a role in IA oversight, albeit indirectly. 
One emerging line of case law deals with the information base of legisla-
tion.9 The case most often cited in the context is Pfizer, which stipulated that 
  Regulation 200/09 would probably have obliged the Commission to grant access to most 
of these opinions upon application by members of the public anyway.
  Craig 200 p. 0.
  Baldwin & Cave 999, p. .
9  Scott & Sturm 200, p.  ff.
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although some assessment is required, the Institutions still have a rather 
large degree of discretion in carrying out these assessments.0 However, 
the limitation of this case is that ‘assessment’ refers to the highly technical 
risk assessment, the requirement for which is usually well delineated in a 
European law. This is distinct from the general requirement to support any 
EU law or policy with an impact assessment that helps political decision-
making by highlighting trade-offs between different policy options whilst 
incorporating the views of stakeholders. As far as those more general Better 
Regulation requirements are concerned, for the time being, the threat of an 
increased judicial interest in the evidence-base of lawmaking is having more 
of an impact on the lawmaking process than the actual legal consequences 
of the case law.
Despite threats from Vice-President Verheugen to that effect there has 
been no judicial action by any Institution to date against another for failing 
to provide a sound information base which can be related to but is distinct 
from the competence base for legislative decisions. Alemanno has pointed to 
a link between this judicial threat and the establishment and development of 
the IAB, asking whether Better Regulation and the IA framework in particu-
lar is not some sort of ‘trojan horse’ that the Commission will regret having 
welcomed in its ranks. 2 Another way of looking at it is that the constant risk 
of juridification of Better Regulation may be an explanation for the deliber-
ate malleability of the IA framework.
Apart from some anecdotal evidence that IAs have been used by parties 
in judicial proceedings in front of the Court, there is one notable example 
of a case in which IA played a role. In Spain v. Council the issue at hand 
was that Commission and Council had amended the rules on the aid to 
cotton farmers, decoupling aid from actual production because the old 
system only led to overproduction. Spain objected and took the case to court, 
putting forward the argument that Commission and Council had failed to 
take labour costs into account, leading to a disproportionate outcome in the 
regulation concerned. On  March 200 Advocate-General Sharpston in 
her opinion on this case explicitly mentioned the lack of impact assessment, 
as a factor in concluding that proportionality had been breached because it 
made choices by the Commission and the Council appear arbitrary, ignor-
0  Case T-/99 Pfizer Animal Health v. Council [2002] ECR II-0.
  Vice-President Verheugen at his examination by the European Union Committee of the 
House of Lords on  July 200 said: ‘If in the co-decision process Parliament and/or Coun-
cil produce amendments, changes which are not only just minor but real changes, then 
there should be an Impact Assessment. If it is not there the Commission will make it very 
clear that the Commission does not feel that there is a sound basis for a proper decision.’
2  Alemanno 2009.
  Meuwese 200, p. . Joerges, 999, p. , citing Majone 99, p. 29 et seq.
  Judgment of  September 200, C-0/0 Spain v. Council [200] ECR I-2.
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ing the Commission’s defence that no IA was required in this case. The 
Court agreed on the outcome of her conclusion and annulled part of Coun-
cil Regulation /200 for breach of the principle of proportionality. It 
also concurred with the Advocate-General in that failure by the Council 
and Commission to take into account certain relevant costs, were of crucial 
importance, but it did not attach similar importance to the absence of an 
official IA as such. However, it does raise the question for how long the 
Institutions will continue to be protected by the established case law on the 
marginal review of the reason-giving requirement of Article 2 EC Treaty 
and the wide margin granted to them when it comes to applying the propor-
tionality principle.
The second body of emerging case law centres around participation 
rights. Scott and Sturm see evidence in the new judicial attention for fair 
participation in regulatory procedures or more widely, ‘governance’ in their 
terminology for a new role for European Courts as ‘catalysts’ for a more 
deliberative and/or reflexive administrative style. The most important case 
illustrating their argument is UEAPME; a case on whether a stakeholder 
organisation that was on the Commission’s list of organisations with a right 
to participate at the early stage of the ‘social dialogue’ was entitled to a place 
at the negotiating table for a European directive on parental leave. A press-
ing issue in this case was whether the organisation had standing before the 
court. The court resolved this issue by engaging with constitutional argu-
ments: because the legislative procedure at hand did not include proper 
involvement of the European Parliament, the ‘participation of the people’ 
must be assured in a different way. In other cases the court has been more 
restrictive. In Bactria for instance, the court only engaged in a very marginal 
review of a comitology procedure, of which a stakeholder had complained 
that it had not received proper access to the regulatory decision-making.9
The case law points to an increasing willingness on the part of the Court 
to compensate for deficits such as the meagre evidence base and the lack of 
openness in European Community rulemaking. Minimum standards for 
the evidence base and enforcement of participation rights – if the Court is 
indeed going in that direction – are solutions that could draw further inspi-
ration from the U.S. system. For instance, one remedy already suggested 
in 999 by Bignami is a notice and comment procedure in comitology to 
resolve the democratic deficit of this type of rulemaking.0
  Craig 200, p. .
  Scott & Sturm 200. 
  Case T-/9 UEAPME.
  Ibid., para 9.
9  Case T-9/00 Bactria.
0  Bignami 999.
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 4  Problem Zone 2: The EU Framework for Agencies 
as a Vehicle?
 . The Rise of European Agencies
As we have seen above, historically the primary objectives of 
the U.S. APA were to control and standardize the decision-making proce-
dures of federal administrative agencies, to counteract the rapid growth 
of the administrative regulation of private conduct, and to recalibrate the 
constitutional balance of governmental powers in the ‘administrative state’. 
The face value parallels between the set of circumstances in pre-war U.S. 
and the socio-economic environment of present day European Union must 
be pointed out. Like under the Roosevelt administration the EU’s executive 
power has grown considerably over the last decades – in institutional terms 
and in substance. EU agencies – administrative EU bodies set up to accom-
plish a specific technical, scientific or managerial task – are mushrooming.2 
Their numbers have surged from  in 200 to 2 in 2009. Administrative 
regulation, although we are not used to labelling it as such, is on the rise too, 
due to comitology, and the EU Commission is, as Craig observes, increas-
ingly undertaking administration directly, without a systematic relationship 
with national administrations. One cause behind this development is that 
the Commission was given wider responsibilities over the years, in part 
because the subject matter involved did not always lend itself to shared man-
agement with Member State authorities, and in part because certain policies 
were best implemented through non-governmental bodies. 
Agencies are an attractive instrument to meet the new administrative 
challenges of the EU. They are used ever more frequently and this is likely 
to continue. For instance, the enactment of REACH, the huge chemicals 
regulation, in 200 was accompanied by the establishment of the Euro-
pean Chemicals Agency (ECHA) in Helsinki. The drive to use more agen-
cies has partly come from within the Commission. As a result of an inter-
nal audit the Commission in the year 2000 committed itself to a reform. 
This entailed, among other things, more focus on the core functions such 
as policy making by delegating administrative responsibilities to agencies. 
  Burnham,999, p. 2-.
2  Andoura and Timmerman call it the ‘agencification frenzy’. Andoura & Timmerman 200, 
p. .
  Majone 99.
  Craig 200, p. 2.
  See Craig 200 and Barkhuysen et al. 200.
  EC 90/200. ‘REACH’ stands for ‘Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restric-
tion of Chemical substances’.
  Reforming the Commission – A White Paper, Part I COM (2000) 200 final/2.
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Craig notes that agencies ‘are here to stay’ as a part of the EU’s institutional 
framework. Agencies however do not have a fixed footing in the Treaties 
and there is no general framework or law governing their set-up or opera-
tion. 
 .2 Governing Agencies
At present there are 2 agencies in the European Union 
in the EU’s first pillar,  if we add the second and third pillar agencies.9 
According to the Community’s website a Community agency is ‘a body 
governed by European public law; it is distinct from the Community Institu-
tions (Council, Parliament, Commission, etc.) and has its own legal person-
ality. It is set up by an act of secondary legislation in order to accomplish a 
very specific technical, scientific or managerial task, in the framework of the 
European Union’s ‘first pillar’.’0 These agencies come in different shapes 
and sizes and have different responsibilities and powers. Different typolo-
gies are circulating. The Commission itself distinguishes two broad types 
of agency,2 regulatory agencies and executive agencies, each with different 
characteristics. ‘Regulatory’ or ‘traditional’ agencies have a variety of spe-
cific roles, set out in their own legal basis, case-by-case. Executive agencies, 
on the other hand, are set up under a Council regulation adopted in 2002 
with the much more narrowly defined task of helping to manage Commu-
  Craig 200, p. 90.
9  See for an overview the EU website at http://europa.eu/agencies/index_en.htm.
0  See http://europa.eu/agencies/community_agencies/index_en.htm’.
  Vos for instance – following a functional approach – distinguishes four types of agencies. 
Agencies which have as their mean function to provide information and are generally 
charged with the coordination and supervision of this information and the creation of 
networks (category ); agencies which provide specific services and/or specific measures 
to implement Community regimes or programmes (category 2); agencies which provide 
specific information, expertise and/or services and/or facilitate co-operation (category ); 
agencies which provide specific information, expertise and/or services, as well as a specific 
measures to implement Community regimes or programmes and monitor at their correct 
implementation (category ). Vos 200, p. 9.
2  In addition to agencies, special partnership bodies – set outside the traditional institutional 
structure – have been set op to stimulate research and economic development. We will not 
discuss them here. 
  At present there are 29 of these agencies (sum total of all three of the EU’s pillars).
  Council Regulation (EC) No /200 of 9 December 2002 laying down the statute for 
executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community 
programmes, OJ L .
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nity programmes. They do not have decision-making or policy-making 
powers, and therefore we will not deal with them in detail here.
The powers and tasks of regulatory agencies vary, but most of them do 
have advisory responsibilities. Typically European agencies provide infor-
mation, expert advice or services, and are generally charged with the coor-
dination and supervision of this information, helping out with cooperation 
and implementation and the creation of networks. Some of them do have 
decision-making powers as well. This seems to set EU agencies apart from 
their federal American counterparts which are for the most part endowed 
with decision-making power and sometimes even with the power to legis-
late.9 In this respect European agencies seem harmless – constitutionally 
speaking; they do not right away upset the balance of power and do not seem 
to have substantial wide ranging powers.0 They seem to serve mere admin-
istrative purposes. Appearances may be deceptive however. In a lot of cases 
there is a substantial indirect effect of EU agencies on EU decision-making 
and legislation. Sometimes it is the Commission that makes the formal deci-
sion, but for that it relies heavily on the views of an agency. De facto it is the 
agency that weighs the interests and decides.2 Because it is still impossible 
  These latter agencies are all based in Brussels. 
  The label regulatory is somewhat confusing for the continental European observer since 
‘regulatory’ doesn’t necessarily mean or indicate that such an agency has the power to legis-
late. See Meuwese 200, p. 2-2.
  The 200 Commission Communication on European agencies distinguishes the following 
categories: 
a) Agencies adopting individual decisions which are legally binding on third parties;  
b) Agencies providing direct assistance to the Commission and, where necessary, to the 
Member States, in the form of technical or scientific advice and/or inspection reports;  
c) Agencies in charge of operational activities;  
d) Agencies responsible for gathering, analyzing and forwarding objective, reliable and easy 
to understand information/networking; 
e) Agencies providing services to other agencies and institutions. See European agencies 
– The way forward,  March 200 COM (200)  final.
  According to Vos 200 only  out of  in 200. 
9  The Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the Operating for the Regulatory Agencies COM 
(200) 9 final even explicitly forbids agencies to adopt general regulatory measures, as well 
as exercising semi-judicial functions, political discretion or responsibilities conferred to the 
Commission. (Article ).  
The proposal for the Draft Agreement was rejected by the Council.
0  Yatanagas points out that, although U.S. and European agencies are set in fundamentally 
different systems, they do face similar problems. Yataganas 200, p. .
  Craig 200, p.  gives the example of the European Medicines Agency (EMEA).
2  Craig 200, p.  labels these agencies that have the actual decisional power as ‘quasi-
regulatory agencies’.
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under the Meroni-doctrine to delegate non-original power to bodies other 
than those established by the Treaties or to delegate power involving a wide 
margin of discretion, ever more of these covert decision-making arrange-
ments are set up in which the Commission merely rubberstamps decisions 
made by an agency. 
 . Comitology as a Contributing Factor
Add to this that agencies also play an ever more impor-
tant role in comitology, that is, the procedure in which the Commission is 
assisted by committees to enact implementing legislation. At present the 
bulk of EU legislation results from comitology. Szapiro estimates that the 
number of implementing measures adopted each year between 200 and 
000 accounts for 90 per cent of the Community’s normative output, with 
often inestimable direct consequences on European citizen’s everyday lives. 
Comitology committees are rampant in the EU (around 20 today). By 
combining, at least in theory, technical expertise and member state control, 
they grease the wheels of the European integration. Comitology, however, 
comes with serious concerns as regards democratic control of the work of, 
in particular, regulatory committees. On top of that the procedure is not 
transparent; it bypasses the checks and balances in the original institutional 
design of the treaties, and thus raises accountability issues. Although espe-
cially the European Parliament is trying to exercise some form of oversight 
and control over comitology by stretching the range of powers under the 
Comitology decision last revised in 200,9 many observers feel that this 
  Case 9/ Meroni & Co. Industrie Matallurgische SpA v. High Authority [9] ECR . 
  Meaning power different from the original power under the Treaty possessed by the body 
delegating the power. 
  See Van Ooik 200, p. 0-. See section 2.2 footnote 2 in particular for the U.S. non 
delegation doctrine. Yatanagas observes that, although the U.S. and the EU face simi-
lar problems as regards the efficiency and legitimacy of the regulatory process in an 
increasingly complex and changing environment, that the Americans take a realistic and 
pragmatic approach, where the Europeans are always prisoners of a flagrantly dogmatic 
legalism (read: Meroni-doctrine).According to Yatanagas dogmatic legalism is rooted in a 
rigid conception of institutional balance within the Community based on case law dating 
back  years. It is – in his view – blocking any development of European decision making 
mechanisms. Yatanagas 200, p. .
  2 in the year 200.
  Szapiro 2009, p. 90.
  Dehousse 99.
9  Council Decision 200/2/EC of  July 200 amending Decision 999//EC laying 
down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commis-
sion, OJ L 200 -.
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does not effectively bring comitology in line with contemporary democratic 
standards.0 It may well be that the increased role of agencies in comitology 
enhances the coordination and expertise in implementation networks and 
answers to the functional needs of the Community. As Dehousse observes, 
they also add to the democratic and accountability issues and make for ever 
more controversial ‘technocratic’ regulation and insufficiently controlled 
administration. Although this does not compromise the institutional bal-
ance of powers in the EU in a formal sense, in reality it does.2 The original 
institutional design of the Treaties does not take full account of comitology 
as such. In this vein of thought, comitology has been labelled a Trojan 
horse to the institutional balance of the EU. Agencies are the product of 
the functional needs of the Community, as is comitology, but these interests 
need to be balanced with, what Everson calls, the needs of the emerging 
political integration of the Union.
 . Agencification and Judicial Review
There is a more practical and pressing drawback of agenci-
fication too. Judicial review of agency decision-making at this moment 
resembles Swiss cheese. The possibilities of bringing legal action against 
agency decisions or actions vary according to acts establishing the agency 
itself. The power of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice or the Court of First 
instance, and the scope of reviewable actions varies accordingly. For an 
aggrieved party it becomes especially difficult to find the way through the 
maze in case the formal authority and the one making the actual decision 
are two different bodies. The Court of First instance in its Artegodan-deci-
0  Szapiro 2009, Neuhold 2009.
  Dehousse 99, p. 2 ff.
2  To solve this problem one could consider loosening the Meroni constraints and come up 
with agencies with autonomous discretionary powers. Majone has floated this idea, arguing 
that some regulatory task cannot be handled by the Commission itself due to constraints on 
its resources. Loosening the constraint however would prompt a whole new set of constitu-
tional issues. See Craig 200, p. 2-. Yatanagas is critical of the Meroni-doctrine too. 
It cripples the ability to meet with the challenges of an increasingly complex and changing 
environment and – as prisoner of flagrant dogmatic legalism – misses out on enhancing the 
efficiency and legitimacy of regulatory processes. Yatanagas 200, p. .
  The Lisbon Treaty does in its Articles 290 and 29. It is not clear however what impact 
these provisions will have for the future of comitology. See Szapiro 2009, p. 0-.
  Neuhold 200.
  Everson 2009.
  I.e. cheese with a lot of wholes in it, like the famous Emmenthaler cheese.
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sion tried to come up with a remedy for this by reviewing an agency’s 
decision although it was not itself the formal author of the decision. But the 
eclectic way in which legal remedies are provided in secondary legislation 
against agency action still remains very complicated and is almost prohibi-
tive. This in turn accounts for limited case law as regards agency operation. 
Courts can only supervise acts of agencies in a very ad hoc fashion: there is 
no uniform judicial review, no logical system. This is why Van Ooik feels the 
U.S. system of judicial review of agency action is ‘more developed’.9
These are not the only reasons to seriously consider a general framework 
for EU agencies. The need to increase transparency, accountability and 
constitutional fit of agency arrangements are also often voiced as an argu-
ment into that direction. In its White Paper on European Governance of 
20090 the Commission spoke out in favour of such an instrument espe-
cially because such a framework could provide an enabling highway to set 
up new ones. It proved however to be tough going to arrive at this general 
framework. In 2002 the Commission kicked of with a Communication 
suggesting an operating framework for the European Regulatory Agen-
cies, along the lines of the framework for Executive agencies.9 In 200 the 
Commission followed suit with a draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the 
Operating for the Regulatory Agencies.92 It met with a lukewarm reception 
and finally failed because the Council did not make it a priority matter. The 
Commission withdrew the proposal and then in 200 watered the initiative 
down by replacing the draft inter-institutional agreement to an invitation to 
an inter-institutional discussion which should lead to a common approach.9 
This dialogue is presently underway with deafening silence. Clearly 
the whole issue has grinded down into an institutional deadlock while 
the need for a general framework only seems to have grown. As Andoura 
and Timmermans observe: ‘the advantages of decentralized, autonomous 
agencies in European governance are clear, this should not distract us from 
the issues of accountability, legitimacy, decentralization, subsidiarity and 
proportionality linked to the agencification process and the heterogeneity 
of the current system of European agencies.’9 Not only does the lack of a 
  Court of First Instance Cases T-, , -, 2,  and /00 Artegodan GmbH v. 
Commission [2002] ECR II-9.
  Van Ooik has – for good reason – pleaded for a more horizontal approach. See Van Ooik 
200, p. -9.
9  Van Ooik 200, p. .
90  White Paper European Governance COM (200) 2 final.
9  COM (2002)  final.
92  COM 200 (200) 9.
9  European agencies – The way forward, Communication from the European Commission  
March 200 COM (200)  final.
9  Andoura & Timmerman 200, p. 2.
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common framework for regulatory agencies cause confusion and hampers 
the understanding of the entire system of agencies,9 it creates legal prob-
lems as well. The patchwork agency system boggles the minds of citizens 
seeking legal protection, raises constitutional questions, for example, in 
relation to legal basis,9 legislative mandate and accountability, and ‘begs the 
question on subsidiarity’ according to Andoura and Timmerman.9
Vos has argued for a Treaty base for agencies, enshrining the legal basis 
and provisions on judicial review and loosely knit constitutive framework 
encompassing the rules and principles governing the operation of such 
agencies. More recently Nieto-Garrido and Delgado in a study covering the 
latest developments added to the argumentation pointing out the need to 
standardize the judicial review of EU agencies and bodies.9 But agencies 
did not gain a firm footing in the Lisbon Treaty. Agencies are mentioned 
in the Treaty and their existence is expressed in a list of reviewable actions 
in the Treaty, but for the most part it is lip service; no general legal basis is 
provided nor a general regime for judicial review of their actions.99 Although 
we do see the various legal and political constraints, we think there is a 
window of opportunity if the general framework for regulatory agencies is 
set up as a cornerstone for European administrative law. This link between 
framing agencies and administrative procedure was made successfully in 
the U.S. 
 5  Learning from the U.S. Experience: The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
In the U.S. system, the problems highlighted by Bignami 
– ‘how to hold the bureaucracy accountable in a system of divided lawmak-
ing’ and ‘how to guarantee stakeholder participation’ – come together in 
the issue of how to control the wide discretion of agencies. The solution has 
been found in counterbalancing discretion by procedural safeguards, includ-
ing participation rights for interested persons. 
The APA can be seen as a compromise between supporters of the 
adversarial system on the one hand and the one’s advocating a more flexible, 
9  Andoura & Timmerman 200, p. 9. Andoura and Timmerman feel that the Commission 
itself in part is to blame for that. The Commission has over the last five years come up with 
different, inconsistent definitions and typologies that have confused the issue. 
9  Most of the agencies are now set up under Article 0 EC, the flexibility clause, which 
stretches the edges of the competence-envelope to the extreme.
9  See Andoura & Timmerman 200, p. 22.
9  Nieto-Garrido & Delgado 200, p. 9-.
99  The European Defense Agency and the European Space Agency are the only ones named in 
the Treaty.
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less formal procedure on the other. In the provisions a distinction is made 
between adjudication and rulemaking and between a formal and informal 
procedure. In studying whether an APA type act might be of inspiration to 
the EU, one has to realise that the APA is quite a flexible act. Courts played 
an essential role in developing administrative law and the procedural rules 
agencies have to comply with. Procedural rules could be tailored to develop-
ments in society, in shifts of power and in rulemaking. As a consequence 
the requirements of the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure have 
changed over time. Also of relevance is that the APA is of a very general 
nature. Agency organic acts determine what procedure has to be followed 
and statutes may set different kind of rules including for instance the 
compulsory production of a regulatory impact assessment.00 Although not 
strictly uniformizing the administrative law system, the APA serves as an 
important conceptual framework.
Nowadays the most important provision for rulemaking is § APA, 
which governs the procedure of informal rulemaking, also called ‘notice-
and-comment’ rulemaking. This has not always been the case. The APA also 
contains a more formal procedure in § APA, that is followed when a stat-
ute requires rules to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency 
hearing (§(c)). The formal procedure has features of a trial and the proce-
dure also needs to be followed in formal adjudications; interested parties 
have several adversarial rights, such as the right to cross-examine witnesses. 
As rulemaking increased, partly due to ‘social regulation’ programs in the 
90’s, these trial-type hearings were considered too formalistic, unneces-
sarily costly and cumbersome and delaying the regulatory program.0 An 
overload of adversarial rights formed a threat to effective administration, 
especially in rulemaking where many parties can be affected and the range 
of issues is wide. Against this background the Supreme Court in Florida 
East Coast by means of statutory interpretation significantly limited the 
number of cases in which rules have to be adopted in the formal proce-
dure.02 Only a clear expression of congressional intent triggers the formal 
procedure; otherwise informal rulemaking will suffice. As a result formal 
rulemaking has been nearly abandoned.
Section  governs the procedure of informal ‘notice-and-comment’ 
rulemaking. The section applies, unless a statute explicitly makes an excep-
00  In various acts, such as the National Environmental Policy Act, 2 U.S.C. §§-, 
Congress imposed upon regulatory agencies a duty to engage in regulatory impact assess-
ment. Other, more general regulatory review requirements can e.g. be found in the Regula-
tory Flexibility Act and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. Regulatory impact analysis 
nevertheless is primarily an instrument for the benefit of Presidential oversight over the 
executive. See Breyer a.o. 200, p. 02 ff and Pierce, Shapiro & Verkuil 200, p. 0 ff.
0  Breyer a.o. 200, p. -20 .
02  United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 0 U.S. 22 (9).
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tion or when one of the exceptions in § occur. For example, interpretative 
rules, general statements of policy and rules of agency organization and 
procedure are exempted. Nor has the procedure to be followed whenever 
an agency for good cause finds the notice-and-comment rulemaking proce-
dure impracticable, unnecessary or contrary to the public interest.0 The 
informal procedure is much more flexible than its formal counterpart is. 
Interested persons have a right to participate, mainly by putting forward 
written comments. An oral hearing is not prescribed and interested persons 
lack adversarial kind of rights. A general notice of proposed rulemaking is 
published in the Federal Register. That notice includes, besides informa-
tion on the procedure to be followed, either the terms or substance of the 
proposed rules or a description of the subject and issues involved.0 After 
the notice the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to partici-
pate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views or argu-
ments. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall 
incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis 
and purpose.0
In the early days the procedure was truly informal. Agencies were not 
obliged to create a record and could base a rule on almost any information. 
The rise in rulemaking in the sixties and seventies of the past century led to 
the abandonment of the burdensome formal procedure. But, the participa-
tion rights in the traditional informal procedure were considered too weak, 
in a society where the public increasingly distrusted agency action. Not all 
interest groups could participate equally in the rulemaking procedure and 
confidence in the expertise of agencies declined. The approach to science 
in general became more sceptical. A deferential review of technical rules 
would run the risk of accepting rules, that besides experts, no one could 
understand. The technical nature of many rules in the sixties and seventies 
for their acceptance asked for more public participation and a stricter review 
of their rationality.0 In this time frame Courts transformed § to a more 
demanding procedure. They would not only review the constitutionality of 
agency rules, but also the rationality. 
Courts increasingly have required agencies to give adequate reasons for 
their decisions.0 The agency’s statement is the basis for judicial review of 
the substance of the rule. Only if the statement is adequately precise, courts 
0  §(b) (A and B).
0  §(b) ().
0  §(c).
0  Bignami 999, p. -; Shapiro 99a, p. -.
0  Pierce, Shapiro & Verkuil 200, p. 2; Shapiro & Levy 9. See for example United States 
v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp.,  F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 9), Weyerhouse Co. v. Costle, 90 
F.2d 0 (D.C. Cir. 9) and Motor Vehicle manufacturers’ Association v. State Farm,  
U.S. 29 (9).
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can review carefully whether the rulemaking is not arbitrary or capricious. 
Also the notice has to be quite precise; without that interested persons can 
not effectively put forward their views. In §(b) and (c) courts have read 
the obligation of the agency to disclose the data on which a proposed rule 
rests. Whenever the proposed rule is based on scientific information, the 
agency has to refer to the used studies, experiments, methodology and so 
on. Thus the duty to create an evidentiary record, although not fitting in the 
traditional idea of an informal procedure and although a regulatory impact 
assessment may not be prescribed by statute, has been created in judicial 
common law.0 Whenever an agency does engage in IA, the information 
to be obtained in that procedure will be part of the rulemaking record. 
Although a court in general cannot directly review the substance of the IA, 
the collected information as part of the record can be used to review the 
substance of the rule.09 Under some acts, a court may even have the power 
to remand a rule back to the agency if it failed to comply with the IA require-
ments.
The record in support of a rule facilitates the ‘hard look’ of courts on 
agency discretion. Courts can closely scrutinize the logical and factual basis 
of a rule, forcing agencies to explain in considerable detail their reasoning.0 
There needs to be a rational connection between the facts found and the 
policy choice made by the agency. In this manner, the duty to state reasons is 
not solely a procedural safeguard that facilitates public participation. It also 
forces agencies to evidence based rulemaking, which enhances substantial 
review. Heightened scrutiny of the rationality of agency decisions became 
a pressing need once the courts accepted delegation of broad regulatory 
powers. 
The insistence on procedural safeguards to limit agency discretion 
has played a prominent role in American administrative law.2 One of the 
reasons to stretch the procedural safeguards for rulemaking can be found 
in the weak constitutional position of the agency, as described before. Public 
participation rights and judicial review provide a substitute for the lack of 
electoral accountability and thus enhance the legitimacy of agency rulemak-
ing. As one American author puts it: ‘[w]hile most of us simply take that 
right for granted, foreigners express amazement’. 
0  Breyer a.o. 200, p. 20 ff.
09  The Regulatory Flexibility Act and the executive orders concerning regulatory analysis 
exclude judicial enforcement of the requirements of an IA. 
0  Breyer a.o. 200, p.  ff.
  Shapiro & Levy 9.
2  Breyer a.o. 200, p. 0.
  Harter 99, p. 0.
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More than 0 years after the enactment of the APA, the general opinion 
seems to be that the act functions well. Its broad language and simplicity 
provides the flexibility needed for tailoring the rules to very different types 
of agency action and to changing relationships between Congress, agencies 
and the people. Rulemaking generally is considered to be more efficient than 
adjudication and to lead to more rational, fairer policy. Large segments of the 
public have the opportunity to effectively influence the agency’s policy. To 
some extent informal rulemaking has diminished the importance of adju-
dications for the development of the legal system. Courts have been able to 
cope with this development in administration; thanks to the APA’s flexibil-
ity. The provisions in the APA enabled the judiciary to review the informal 
rulemaking procedure more stringently. Also the changing nature of the 
rulemaking issues, becoming more technical and fact-orientated in time, 
asked for extra procedural requirements to the notice-and-comment rule-
making provisions, such as an obligation to develop fact-gathering proce-
dures. Courts have shown themselves to be eager to scrutinize the agency’s 
fact finding. The increased procedural requirements have strengthened 
public participation, improved the transparency of agency action, facilitated 
a more stringent review and probably has led to a fairer procedure. Schol-
arly evaluations include one by Majone, who feels that the U.S. APA is an 
outstanding example of procedural control of agency discretion. According 
to McCubbins et al. an instrument like the APA not only facilitates fairness 
and legitimacy in agency decision-making but it fulfils important control 
functions, increasing the control and influence of political executives, stake-
holders and citizens and enhancing the responsiveness of expert agencies. 
This flexibility of APA and the leeway that it offers to courts also has a 
negative side to it. Numerous scholars have criticized the role of the judiciary 
and its strict review, leading to an ‘ossification’ of the rulemaking process. 
This refers to the complaint that the informal rulemaking procedure has 
become so burdensome and the risk of judicial rejection of the rule so high, 
that the increased procedural safeguards have an adverse effect in the end.9 
For an agency it can be more efficient to shift to other means to change its 
policy, for example through adjudications (thus the policy change is less 
visible), through rules excluded in § (such as policy statements or proce-
dural rules) or even secretive rules. The intensity of the review can also lead 
  Harter 99; Morrison 9; Pierce 99; Shapiro 99b.
  Morrison 9, p. 2, 2.
  Majone 200, p.-.
  McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 9, p. 2-2.
  Breyer a.o. 200, p. -0; Pierce, Shapiro & Verkuil 200, p. 9-0.
9  Pierce 99, p. 2-: the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure takes an agency at 
least five years, requires tens of thousands of staff hours and fifty percent finally is rejected 
in courts.
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to a more conservative policy, because proposing new rules might be too 
cumbersome. Another line of criticism is based on the idea of the separation 
of powers. Courts are criticised for overplaying their hand. With their ‘hard 
look’ courts are said to have encroached upon the executive power, while 
they lack political accountability. The inclusiveness of stakeholder participa-
tion is a sensitive issue as well. Some groups have more resources to effec-
tively comment on proposals and therefore will have a larger influence than 
others on the outcome of procedures. 
The legitimacy of agency actions, the legal and constitutional basis for 
their setup and operation and the checks on administrative discretion are 
themes that deserve constant attention. Public participation rights in rule-
making and judicial review are generally highly valued, though the strict-
ness of the judicial review has been challenged. Whether the APA needs 
adjustments and if so what kind, will be highly dependent on one’s view of 
the nature of government and conception of democracy.20 
 6  Conclusion: A Preliminary Verdict on the 
Desirability of a European APA
Outcomes of comparative research most of the time do not 
prove anything in the scholarly sense of the word, but comparisons are often 
inspirational since they sometimes show how different solutions were found 
for identical problems. Although the EU and U.S. systems of administration 
differ considerably in terms of constitutional settings and systems and styles 
of administration, they face certain similar challenges. In our view three 
main challenges ask for rethinking the desirability of a general EU admin-
istrative law act: the concept of control of the administration, efficiency and 
legitimacy. 
The first challenge, the conceptual one, is a vital but under-researched 
one. The discussion on the future of the EU administration – becoming ever 
more important and powerful – is largely determined by the logic derived 
from the parliamentary democracy paradigm. But the EU system is not that 
of a parliamentary democracy and as a consequence the control exercised 
over the EU administration works differently, leaving gaps in accountability 
and judicial review.2 Not only is the underpinning system different, the EU 
administration differs increasingly from concepts of administration as we 
are familiar with in continental Europe. The EU administration is deeply 
involved in regulation, more independent and less intensely controlled by 
political bodies than Member States administrations are. These features 
imply that the present constitutional framework is not entirely fitting. This 
20  Pierce, Shapiro & Verkuil 200, p. -0.
2  Verhey, Broeksteeg & Van Driessche 200.
2
meuwese, schuurmans, voermans
realisation in itself is similar to the American awakening in the 90s that 
the administration as it was developing no longer fitted the mole of the sepa-
ration of powers under the U.S. Constitution.22 There is already a chorus 
of authors rallying for a paradigm shift or a redefinition of the concept of 
European administration.2 We are as of yet not at that particular junction, 
but to our mind the analysis shows that we need to take a broader view on 
European administration to fully understand its complexity, operation and 
current problems. In early 2st century Europe ‘traditional legal categories 
have ceased to reflect adequately to the actual operation of the EU’s machin-
ery’, in the words of Dehousse.2 ‘Soft law’ solutions, like Better Regulation 
with instruments such as impact assessment and enhanced consultation, 
are triggering some changes but are also running into the limits of what is 
changeable outside of the formal Treaty framework. These new tools and 
procedures, as well as the refuge decision-makers are widely seeking in 
agency-based governance settings, can be seen as attempts to address the 
second and third challenges, those of efficiency and legitimacy. However, 
the analysis above shows that the half-hearted way in which the changes are 
implemented creates new problems as well. 
No general code of European administration exists today and a lot 
of authors feel it is not likely to come about in the near future.2 Treaty 
constraints and the composite and decentralized character of EU admin-
istration and administrative law hinder the development of a code. Some 
feel detailed codification is undesirable altogether.2 That may hold true 
for comprehensive codification of European administrative law, but not for 
all parts of it. Some of the problems of EU administrative action leave no 
room for complacency. Proposals to adopt a European APA which would 
give interest groups the right to participate in rulemaking procedures and 
to bring actions before the ECJ for infringement of essential procedural 
requirements for manifest errors have been made in the past.2
Yatanagas argues that a European APA is perfectly imaginable in the 
context of existing provisions of the Treaty and of secondary legislation. The 
Commission must propose a regulation on the basis of Article 0 on the 
22  As Dwight phrased in his classic ‘The Administrative State’: ‘This expansion [of govern-
mental activities] upset old balances, raised questions of the appositeness of the old theory. 
At the federal level the creation of ‘independent establishments,’ (…) raised a presumption 
that the ‘tripartite theory’ was being violated, that it should either be reapplied, or else be 
modified or abandoned.’ Dwight 9, p. 0. 
2  Bignami 200, Dehousse 2002. 
2  Dehousse 2002, p. 20.
2  Jans, De Lange, Prechal & Widdershoven 200, p. 9- and Kadelbach 200, p. 20 in 
which he depicts the ‘leave-it-as-it-is’ approach as one of the possible avenues. 
2  Harlow 999.
2  Yataganas 200, p. 0.
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administrative procedures to be followed in the regulatory process, that the 
Council and Parliament will confirm by co-decision.2 A European style 
APA like the one proposed here would not need to entail a comprehensive 
codification of EU administrative law, but could stop at a ‘light‘ bill that 
only touches upon ‘regulatory’ and ‘institutional’ issues. For that no Treaty 
amendment is needed: an APA ‘light’ could be enshrined in secondary 
legislation with ease.29 The case of the Regulation 09/200 on the public 
access to EU documents proves important constitutional steps can be made 
without Treaty change.0 The possibility to appeal executive EU regulation 
under the Lisbon Treaty can serve as a stepping stone (and maybe centre-
piece) for a APA EU style.
The U.S. Administrative Procedure Act could serve as a source of inspira-
tion for Europe in two different ways: first as a source of ‘legal transplanta-
tion’ of certain concepts and second as the generic (transsystemic) idea of 
an ‘APA’. We are not the first to suggest this. Borrowing and transplant-
ing solutions from foreign system is practical and sometimes wholesome, 
although there maybe side-effects which can turn legal transplants into legal 
irritants. Especially the APA notions of a notice and comment procedure, 
the elaboration of participation rights and a uniform system of judicial 
review against agency action and executive regulation2 are recommendable 
to tackle current regulatory and agency-related problems in the EU. 
A European APA would be a compromise, just like the U.S. APA was, and 
as any attempt at a general framework or codification of administrative law 
would be. Yet this does not wipe out the principal and practical motives to 
favour an attempt at a European APA. Kadelbach, for one, believes there are 
various advantages to codification, one of them being that an administrative 
law act sends a signal to the European executive to adhere strictly to the rule 
of law and to enhance the awareness that its actions are subject to review. 
This could serve as a means to reduce widespread citizens’ distrust in ‘Brus-
sels’ and thus have a positive effect on public opinion. More general we feel 
that, as a matter of principle, a European APA could rebalance the original 
institutional equilibrium in the EU context and update the legal regime for 
the EU administration. Legitimacy and efficiency problems, legal bottle-
2  Yatanagas 200, ibidem.
29  Nieto-Garrido and Delgado have suggested cutting up the question of codification of 
administrative law into separate parts in order to overcome the problems of comprehensive 
codification. Nieto-Garrido & Delgado 200, p. 2 ff.
0  Regulation (EC) No 09/200 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 0 May 
200 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission docu-
ments, OJ L , p. -.
  Teubner 99.
2  See Article 29c, par. 2, of the Lisbon Treaty.
  Kadelbach 200, p. 20-20.
0
meuwese, schuurmans, voermans
necks and constitutional issues could be settled in one stroke. It would also 
tie in well with the possibility to appeal EU regulatory acts before the Euro-
pean Court of Justice under the Lisbon Treaty. Although somewhat indi-
rectly the Lisbon Treaty introduces a balanced two tiered system of control 
and review of EU legislation. The first panel of this system is regular politi-
cal control over ‘legislative’ acts by Commission, Council and the European 
Parliament via the ordinary legislative procedure enshrined in the Treaty 
(Article 29a of the Lisbon Treaty). The second panel of the constitutional 
framework consists of the possibility to appeal regulatory acts – delegated 
and implementing acts in the terms of the Lisbon Treaty – by individuals 
or legal persons. There are however missing links in this system. Participa-
tion rights and transparency issues as regards executive regulation remain 
unresolved. This can make the right of appeal a toothless tiger. For the same 
reason an obligatory impact assessment of proposed executive regulation 
is warranted in order to give the appellants means to dispute the evidence-
base. In this more practical respect a European APA would benefit European 
regulatee seeking legal protection against agency action too. At present they 
are confronted with an ‘unsystematic patchwork of highly specific rules, and 
on the other hand a set of general principles.’ The administrative proce-
dure, the general principles involved, as well as the legal remedies are for the 
most part unfathomable for ordinary citizens and businesses at the moment. 
An APA could be used as a vehicle to operationalise some of these common 
principles of EU administrative law, for example, principles like legal basis, 
legality, legitimate expectations, general provisions on proportionality and 
transparency.
One may of course question whether ‘American-inspired’ judicial review 
of rules is the best way forward. In many EU countries the judicial admin-
istrative law system is mainly built on the review of individual decisions 
and participation rights in rulemaking are rare. A radical break with this 
tradition might be a bridge too far. Furthermore, many observers feel that 
the U.S. example shows that judicial review of rulemaking carries the risks 
of activism and ossification. In view of this, compromise solutions such as 
standing rights for bodies with a ‘watchdog-like’ or ‘whistleblowing func-
tion’ have been proposed. The latter idea comes from Everson who gives the 
not so well-suited example of European parliamentary committees, but clari-
fies that she is referring to ‘bodies who retain a degree of impartiality within 
the regulatory decision-making process and who thus are best placed to 
  Kadelbach 200, p. 92.
  These principles are already part of the community acquis, either expressed in case law, 
secondary legislation or other documents (like The general code of good administration 
elaborated by the European Ombudsman, the Commission’s Code of Good Administrative 
Behavior) and do not impinge on the administrative law systems of the Member States.
  E.g. Harlow 999.
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trigger the judicial review of deliberation’. Yet, as Shapiro argues, a phase 
of more intensive judicial review might be needed in the EU as an engine of 
change, in order to bring consistency to the changing system, much in the 
way that happened in the U.S. Much will depend upon the way the ECJ 
will handle its new powers to review. Restrictively only marginally reviewing 
delegated ‘regulatory’ acts, or intensely, by reviewing both the regulatory act 
itself as well as the basic or parent act delegating the power?9 A European 
APA offers the ECJ a useful framework for its task and offers legal certainty 
for European citizens. Ideally it will steer the development of EU administra-
tive law in a direction that fosters a transparent and fair exercise of regula-
tory governance.
  Everson 999, p. 09.
  Shapiro 200, p. 2-29.
9  Article 29B of the Treaty of Lisbon only allows for delegation of ‘non-essential’ elements 
of a legislative act. The question is whether or not appeals claiming that indeed essential 
elements have been delegated can and will be successful. 
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